A large number of people rely on medicinal plants for maintaining their health and treating diseases. Official data on medicinal plant markets are, however, virtually non-existent and available local-level case studies do not allow generalisations. This study investigates the market efficiency and benefit distribution in the Nepal-India medicinal plant market by building a national-level dataset along the market chain from harvester in Nepal to regional wholesaler in India. Data were collected using open-ended questionnaires administered to medicinal plant harvesters (n = 639), traders (n = 166) and central wholesalers (n = 90) in 15 districts in Nepal and regional wholesalers (n = 53) in India. Results show indications of market inefficiency; there are spatial arbitrage opportunities and skewed distribution of net marketing margins. Harvesters operate with net margins at 34-55% of the Indian wholesaler price, while net margins for traders and central wholesalers are -5-20% and 25-36%, respectively. There seems to be an exploitative relationship between central wholesalers and traders. The average annual value of unprocessed medicinal plant exports from Nepal is estimated at PPP US$39-159 million, making this the country's fifth most important export commodity; only a third of the potential government revenue is collected. It is argued that medicinal plants are currently neglected in national development interventions and policies in Nepal.
Introduction
Medicinal plants are plants used for maintaining health and/ or treating specific ailments and diseases, and may constitute the most common human use of biodiversity (Hamilton 2004) . Schippmann et al. (2002) estimate the global number of medicinal plant species at almost 53,000, corresponding to 10-18% of the world's vascular plant species (Hamilton 2004) . There are indications that medicinal plants have been traded internationally for millennia (Jacob and Jacob 1993) and international trade continues today (e.g. Royal Botanic Garden 1998; Olsen 2005a). The World Health Organisation has estimated that 80% of the world's population relies solely or largely on traditional remedies for healthcare (Bannerman 1982) , and Lambert et al. (1997) speculate that more than two billion people may be heavily reliant on medicinal plants. Although considerable uncertainty surrounds these often cited figures, there is no doubt that medicinal plants play an important role in the livelihoods of a vast number of people in both developed and developing countries, and that local, national and international markets are important in making this possible.
Most work on medicinal plant trade has focused on biological rather than economic aspects. Despite the scale and importance of medicinal plant trade, there are few studies on medicinal plant markets; these include the studies on medicinal plant trade in South Africa (e.g. Mander 1998; Williams et al. 2000; Botha et al. 2004) , Mexico (e.g. Nicholson and Arzeni 1993; Hersch-Martinez 1995) , and Europe (e.g. Lange and Schippmann 1997; Kathe et al. 2003) . There are also examples of detailed studies of single species (e.g. Cunningham et al. 1997 ) and integration of medicinal plant trade analysis in wider non-timber forest product studies (e.g. Shanley et al. 2002) . While these studies contribute to quantification of trade levels and understanding market structures, they do not address issues related to market efficiency. Such studies presently seem exclusive to South Asian medicinal plant markets -with most information on the structure, conduct and performance of markets stemming from studies of trade in medicinal plants from Nepal. Here we know that: simple technology is required for harvesting, drying, storing and transporting raw materials (Olsen 1998) ; all products are air-dried and non-perishable (Edwards 1996; Olsen 1998) and thus can be subjected to rough handling, transport and long-term storage; there is a low threshold to entry for harvestersno formal training of harvesters is required and capital requirements are insignificant (Olsen and Helles 1997a; Olsen 1998) ; men, women and children are all involved in harvest (Pandit and Thapa 2003; Olsen and Bhattarai 2005; Bista and Webb 2006) while traders and wholesalers are men only (Olsen and Bhattarai 2005) ; returns to labour in wild harvesting are highly variable depending on season, location, harvesting strategy (opportunistic vs. dedicated), available labour, physical strength and experience (Olsen 1998; Olsen and Larsen 2003; Bista and Webb 2006) ; collection is considered an arduous and low prestige activity (Larsen and Smith 2004) ; access to resources ranges from open to private depending on product and location (Larsen and Olsen 2007) ; there is a standard marketing chain with standard actors (Olsen and Bhattarai 2005) ; the market is mature with simple product specifications and private treaty trading (Olsen and Helles 1997a; Olsen 1998) ; there are usually simple relations between actors -though these are dynamic and may also be complex, e.g. involving social networks and procedures such as advance payment (e.g. Humphrey 1992; Daniggelis 1997) ; there is lack of marketing information up the marketing chain (Olsen and Helles 1997a; Rawal and Poudyal 1999) ; and thresholds to entry at trader and wholesaler levels due to capital requirements and marketing networks are high (Olsen and Helles 1997a) . Furthermore, the general volume and value of medicinal plant trade at the national level have been estimated (Olsen 2005a (Olsen , 2005b and 93% is estimated to be exported unprocessed, i.e. just air-dried, to India (Olsen 2005b) .
Regarding market efficiency, very little information is available. In their review of inter alia the role of middlemen in medicinal plant trade in the central Himalaya, Larsen and Olsen (2007) observed differential access to price information, with general agreement that central wholesalers control market information and are able to capture very large profit margins. They also noted that the number of traders in any single location was low. Olsen and Helles (1997a) reported indications of poor market integration. It also appears that there are large in-country price variations (Sharma 1995; Edwards 1996; Hertog 1997; Olsen and Helles 1997a) . Medicinal plant harvest and trade in Nepal is heavily regulated (Forest Regulation 1995): some species are banned from harvest, others may not be exported unprocessed, all harvesters need collection permits, transport permits are needed for transport out of district of origin, police and forest staff have rights of inspection, etc. This means that almost all harvest is illegal (Larsen et al. 2005) as is most of the trade (Olsen 2005a) and that rent-seeking is widespread (Edwards 1996; CECI 1999; Olsen and Helles 1997b) .
There is no universally accepted definition of market efficiency (Fackler and Goodwin 2001) . In this paper, market efficiency is interpreted to exist when (i) the price of a homogenous good at any two locations differs by no more than the transport cost from the lower price location to the higher price location (no spatial arbitrage opportunities), and (ii) net marketing margins are not excessively high when all transaction costs have been estimated. The weaknesses of the existing studies related to market efficiency are that they are local in nature (conducted at the district level or below) and usually not specific when it comes to cost analysis. The lack of prices and transaction cost data makes it very difficult to use conventional tests, e.g. using time series econometrics, to investigate market efficiency (Baulch 1997; Barrett 2001) . Therefore, this paper, as also recommended by Neumann and Hirsch (2000) , takes a direct approach by interviewing actors along the marketing chain.
The purpose of the present study is to investigate the market efficiency and benefit distribution in a medicinal plant market in South Asia, in casu Nepal-India, by building a national-level dataset along the market chain from harvester to regional wholesaler. This market is particularly interesting as it is mature (long-established), international (with India importing raw materials from all neighbouring countries), and large (huge number of products and stakeholders). A well-designed study should thus be methodologically interesting for studies of other complex, and less complex medicinal plant markets. Findings should also make possible an estimate of the actual economic contribution of medicinal plant trade to the national economy of a small country. Based on the understanding of the physical, exchange and facilitating functions of marketing and market efficiency derived from the above local-level studies, we hypothesise in this national-level study that (i) there will be market inefficiency expressed as spatial arbitrage opportunities and skewed distribution of net marketing margins along the marketing chain, and (ii) medicinal plant trade contributes significantly to the national economy, with government taxes remaining largely uncollected.
The data on which this paper is based were collected in 1998-99. Although this is a decade ago, the presentation and analysis of these data remain relevant as: (i) the study provides insight into how medicinal plant markets operate at regional and national levels -a topic on which very little has been published; and (ii) due to the political situation in Nepal, since 1999, it has not been possible to conduct a comparable national-level study.
Methods

Study area
The study focused on a national-level analysis of market efficiency in the Nepal to India trade in medicinal plantsfrom harvest in Nepal to the wholesaler markets in India. Nepal was chosen as it was known to have high and regular levels of medicinal plant extraction; while India is known to be a major country for the consumption of medicinal plants. This trade is centuries old (Regmi 1972; Olsen and Helles 1997b) . This paper uses the actor terminology suggested by Olsen and Bhattarai (2005) -harvesters, local traders, central wholesalers and regional wholesalers. Harvesters collect medicinal plants, mainly in the wild, and sell them to local traders who consolidate large numbers of small sales into large lots for sale to central wholesalers (bulking up). These then sell to regional wholesalers in India who sell to intermediaries, such as producers of traditional medicine, or retailers mainly in India (bulk breaking). Products are only air-dried and cleaned; further processing is rare. This study does not investigate post-regional wholesaler issues, e.g. through retail or consumer surveys; no such studies have yet been published.
Data collection
To most effectively explore the market, we adopted a marketing chain approach. We investigated the flow of medicinal plant products from harvesters to regional wholesalers and determined the number and nature of each actor along the chain. The emphasis was on estimating marketing costs and margins for each product and the main actor groups involved in the trade. To investigate the trade at the national level in Nepal, we first stratified the country into 15 cells using the three main physiographic zones and five development regions as proxies for north-south altitude and east-west climatic variations. In each cell, a district was randomly chosen. During fieldwork in the districts, all encountered harvesters (n = 639) and all traders (n = 149; some were encountered in more than one location so total number of trader interviews is n = 166) were interviewed. All central medicinal plant wholesalers (n = 90), regardless of their location in Nepal, were interviewed, as were regional wholesalers (n = 53) in the main importing cities in India. Wholesalers were identified through existing lists (such as ANSAB 1997) and interviews with traders and other wholesalers. All actors were interviewed faceto-face using standardised open-ended questionnaires. General annual data as well as data for the case year 1997-98 were collected; fieldwork was conducted from August 1998 to September 1999. In each actor group, data collection focused on amounts, sales prices and costs. All values were collected in Nepalese (Nr) or Indian rupees. In general, informants were open, relaxed and prepared to talk about their involvement in the trade. Medicinal plant species that are banned from collection were not included in the survey. All data from the interviews were corroborated through direct observations, e.g. species stored, and triangulation, e.g. using already published local studies, whenever possible.
Data analysis
An overview of the national-level annual volume and value of commercial medicinal plant trade in Nepal is provided in Olsen (2005a) . It was found that the top four products made up almost 44% of the total value of trade in 1997-98 (with each remaining product having a share of 0-6%); this paper focuses on the top four products (Table 1 ). An overview of actor groups is provided in Table 2 .
The validity and reliability of the trade data relies on harvesters', traders' and wholesalers' own-estimates of amounts and values. It may be that these are incorrect, e.g. if traders feel obliged to answer questions but do not wish to disclose information. In order to further verify data and the accuracy of reporting, basic distributional statistics for selected prices and costs, such as storage costs and rent-seeking, were analysed. It was found that these own-reported data on the medicinal plant trade were valid and reliable (Olsen and Helles 2006) . Then, for each of the four species, marketing margin analysis was done. This was followed by exploration of trade data at development region level and regional price tests to investigate spatial arbitrage. Calculations of national-level direct economic benefits from the medicinal plant trade were made across all traded species using the volume figures reported by Olsen (2005a) and average cost figures derived from the marketing margin analysis of the four key species.
Results
Market efficiency
Market efficiency is analysed by investigating spatial pricing efficiency (price structure along marketing chain for each product, identification of key cost factors, regional price variations) and, briefly, temporal (historical prices, seasonal prices) pricing efficiency.
Spatial pricing efficiency
The national-level price breakdown along the medicinal plant marketing chain is provided in Table 3 . Using species-specific agent data on shrinkage (e.g. local traders reported loss during storage of 3.8 AE 1.7% for S. chirayita, n = 55), conversion factors (e.g. (1/(1 -0.38)) = 1.04 for S. chirayita) are used to express all costs and margins in terms of 1 kg of the final product (e.g. the average harvester selling price of 62.22 is multiplied by 1.04 to get the local trader buying price for S. chirayita).
There is very little species-specific variation in cost factors; differences in cost levels between species are due to differences in raw material prices. In fact, raw material purchasing price is the absolute dominant cost factor with no other cost above 5 Nr/kg. In total, costs of storage, transport, royalties, duties and rent-seeking constitute less than 11% of costs for local traders and central wholesalers; the exception is the low value product from S. mukorossi, where raw material cost makes up about 71% of total costs. For this product, central wholesaler and local trader transport costs (16% and 21%, respectively) become important. In general, the cost structure and cost level are similar for local traders and central wholesalers, with the exception that local traders carry the cost of royalty payments. Regarding margins, it is seen that harvesters operate with net margins at 34-55% of the India wholesaler price. Local traders operate with very low (even negative) net margins for two products; as the calculations are done based on average prices, and not a negative scenario, this indicates that this group is under pressure. In all cases, their average net margins, ranging from -5 to 20%, are well below the net margins of the central wholesalers at 25-36%. All four products are traded throughout the country. An overview of the regional distribution of trade is presented in Table 4 . There is much variation in trade across the country in terms of distribution of number of traders, volume traded and price levels; e.g. the spread between the average harvester and central wholesaler prices for N. scrophulariiflora varies from 12 Nr/kg in the far-western development region to 85 Nr/kg in the western development region. There are thus large price differences between development regions indicating, e.g. that there are places where local traders are under relatively higher pressure. Spatial aspects of pricing were investigated at the development region level by conducting one-way ANOVA tests for equal average harvester and equal average central wholesaler prices across the five development regions. Prices were found not to be equal for both prices for all four products (p , 0.001; except for A. racemosus central wholesaler prices: F 4,27 = 5.56, p = 0.002).
Post hoc tests (LSD) were done for the four products to determine which development regions differed significantly in mean prices. The results are summarised in Table 5 . There are significant differences in 63% and 68% of all possible cases (25/40 and 26/38) for harvester and central wholesaler prices, respectively; and there is not a single example of either price being similar for all four products in any two development regions. Regarding the four products, they are all subject to significant price differences: 50-80% and 40-90% of all possible harvester and central wholesaler prices comparisons are significantly different. Regarding development regions, the significantly lower prices paid by central wholesalers in the far-western region stand out as do the significantly lower harvester selling prices (except for N. scrophulariiflora; reason unknown) in the same region. There is also a pattern of higher central wholesaler prices being paid in the mid-western region. Given the low level of transport costs (Table 3) , the significant differences above (with absolute price levels given in Table 4 ) cannot be explained by difference in transportation costs.
Temporal pricing efficiency
There is only very limited information on historical price developments and intra-seasonal price variations. It appears that prices may vary significantly both within a few years and in the same season, and that these variations are speciesspecific. Data availability does not allow analysis of historical price trends, including calculation of seasonal indices. For Nardostachys grandiflora, Olsen and Bhattarai (2000) found an increase in wholesaler price in Delhi over 3 years of 65% while the harvester price in Nepal stayed constant. In the present study, regional wholesaler average monthly prices were monitored for 1 year for all four products Regarding seasonal price changes, Olsen and Helles (1997a) found that central wholesaler prices in one trading season ranged from constant to double, depending on species. The limited number of regional wholesaler price observations in the present study showed nominal price variation up to about 35% within a year. Thus the available, albeit very limited, data indicate that speculative storage is attractive to wholesalers. Tables 4 and 5 also indicate that spatial arbitrage is attractive to all actors. Table 6 further explores the national-level minimum-maximum range of marketing margins for each actor assuming (i) average purchasing prices and costs (from Table 3 ), and (ii) use of speculative storage to sell at lower (failure to speculate) and upper (successful) boundary of mean AE s.d. selling prices (Olsen and Helles 2006, Table 1 ). Net margins are always positive for harvesters and central wholesalers, while local traders risk negative net margins for two products, with the net margin for S. mukorossi negative even with successful Using the harvesters' own-reported selling price. The India wholesale price is the average price paid by regional wholesalers (n = 53, all located in India); this price is assumed equal to the central wholesaler selling price. Local trader shrinkage, due to moisture loss during storage, is 3.8 AE 1.7% for S. chirayita, 2.5 AE 0.7 for S. mukorossi, 3.5 AE 1.1 for A. racemosus, 2.2 AE 1.1 for N. scrophulariiflora; this gives conversion factors of 1.04, 1.03, 1.04 and 1.02. Likewise, central wholesaler conversion factors are calculated (storage losses of 2.8 AE 0.7% for S. chirayita, 2.7 AE 1.5 for S. mukorossi, 3.9 AE 1.2 for A. racemosus, 2.3 AE 1.3 for N. scrophulariiflora) as 1.03, 1.03, 1.04 and 1.02. b Rent-seeking rates are non-species specific. Average of 8.51 Nr/load with an average load of 67.8 AE 28.6 kg, n = 622. Harvesters have no other marketing costs: capital costs are very close to zero and transport costs are considered part of the cost of production.
c Local traders' storage costs are estimated based on (i) rent: an average storage rent of 1867 Nr/month, storage space rented all year, average storage of 15,396 AE 21434, n = 166, kg, all species require same amount of storage space per kg, (ii) interest charge: average monthly interest rate of 1.4% (approx. 18% p.a.), average species specific storage time of 2.3 AE 0.9 month for S. chirayita, 2.9 AE 0.8 for S. mukorossi, 2.5 AE 0.9 for A. racemosus, 2.2 AE 0.7 for N. scrophulariiflora. Central wholesalers' cost of storage is calculated based on (i) rent: an average storage rent of 4154 Nr/month, storage space rented all year, average storage of 64,336 AE 72,359 kg, all species require the same amount of storage space per kg; (ii) interest charge: average monthly interest rate of 1.4% (approx. 18% p.a.), average species specific storage time of 1.9 AE 0.9 month for S. chirayita, 3.3 AE 1.1 for S. mukorossi, 2.8 AE 1.1 for A. racemosus, 2.6 AE 0.9 for N. scrophulariiflora. d Local traders' transport costs based on (i) non-species specific handling/loading and truck rental costs reported in Olsen and Helles (2006, e Almost 88% of local traders claim to pay royalties. However, it is well-known that only a minor part of trade is subject to royalty payment (e.g. Edwards 1996; Hertog 1997) . From Table 7 it is estimated that only about one-third of due royalty is collected by the Department of Forest. Therefore, in this table, the applied royalty rates are one-third of the official rates. In addition, rent-seeking is paid to forest officials (can be considered fees to facilitate paper work). Central wholesalers are assumed to pay the official custom duty of 0.5% of the border price; the latter is assumed equal to the central wholesaler buying price. f Local traders and central wholesalers are subject to non-species specific rent-seeking by forest officials and police personnel in Nepal and India as specified in Olsen and Helles (2006, The estimated no. of local traders/the actual no. of central wholesalers trading each species. First figure calculated by simple multiplication of observed no. of local traders handling each species in each case district with no. of districts in each cell; then summing per development region. b Extrapolated from local traders' own-reported data.
c Weighted and non-weighted average prices are virtually similar. Here is used the non-weighted average prices.
storage speculation. The net margin range for local traders is always much lower than for other actors.
National distribution of direct benefits from the trade in medicinal plants We estimated the national-level direct economic contribution of trade in medicinal plants using the volume figures in Olsen (2005a) and the average costs in Olsen and Helles (2006 , Table 1 ). Benefits are distributed according to groups of main beneficiaries, Table 7 The major share of earnings (about 47%) goes to harvesters followed by central wholesalers (,33%); the share captured by local traders is very low (,1%). Royalties make up about 7% of benefits, followed by the transport sector (,6%), property rental (,3%), rent-seekers (,1%) and customs duties (,0.5%). Note, however, that royalty figures refer to estimated amounts that should be generated given the level of the trade; data from the Department of Forest (CBS 1999) show that, in the case year, the revenue collected from herb items amounted to only PPP US$2.2 million, i.e. only about a third of the available amount.
Discussion
Market efficiency
The consistently high net marketing margins captured by central wholesalers and the low net marketing margins for local traders indicate an exploitative relationship between these two groups. It may be, as previously argued by Olsen and Helles (1997a) , that central wholesalers act as a passive oligopsony: they are few and their position in the marketing chain combined with the services they provide, not least Indian networks and their ability to negotiate prices, allow them to set low buying prices. Furthermore, almost 78% of central wholesalers provided credit to local traders -this may be contributing to establishing control of local traders by limiting their number of sales points. It should, however, also be noted that functions of good governance (Veeman 2002) are not present in the market: rules and regulations regarding harvest and trade of medicinal plants can be locally interpreted and implemented (Larsen et al. 2005) , prices for some products may change rapidly over short periods of time (Olsen and Bhattarai 2000) , and rent-seeking at all levels is common. This means that central wholesalers carry financial risks that are not presently included in their net margins (risk-bearing costs). But the same set of factors also implies risk-bearing costs for local traders; costs that are difficult to cover within the present low levels of net margins. It could be that local trader net margins vary significantly from year to year and that the present case year just constitutes a bad year for local traders. However, previous local-level studies of net margins (Sharma 1995; Olsen and Helles 1997a; Olsen and Bhattarai 2000) confirm the findings in the present paper; and no case study has ever reported high local trader net margins and low central wholesaler margins for the same product in the same trading season. The organisation of trade explains why local traders are forced to buy products even if the net margin is negative: an average harvester sells two products (Olsen and Bhattarai 2005) and will not accept additional transport costs if a local trader does not buy all his products. There are many examples in the literature of exploitative relationships between harvesters and middlemen (Neumann and Hirsch 2000) but this is not found in (Neumann and Hirsch 2000; Tewari 2006 ). The distribution of net marketing margins is thus skewed with the central wholesaler net margins appearing excessively high. Transport costs are low and cannot generally explain regional price differences; spatial arbitrage is attractive to all actors but is probably not exercised to any great extent by harvesters, many of whom require prior (before they go to point of sale) information on prices in order to benefit from spatial arbitrage, or traders who appear to be exploited by central wholesalers. Through their access to prices in India, the central wholesalers also appear to be in the best position to benefit from seasonal arbitrage, i.e. the opportunities presented by short run price changes. Regarding the first hypothesis, it is concluded that there are indications of pricing inefficiency in the market.
Contribution to the national economy
The value of medicinal plant exports (Olsen 2005a ) makes these the fifth most important export commodity to Nepal, only surpassed by manufactured goods, food and live animals, chemicals and drugs, and animal and vegetable oils and fats (CBS 1999) . Regarding the second hypothesis, export of largely unprocessed medicinal plant products is clearly of national economic importance though this is not presently recognised as a consequence of the gross underestimation of the value of medicinal plants in official statistics. The end result is neglect of medicinal plants in development interventions and policies. This is again reflected in failure to collect trade-generated government revenue and the existence of policy tools with no anchorage in reality, e.g. the royalty rate for Berginia ciliata is 10 Nr/ kg compared to a national average central wholesaler buying price of 9.83 Nr/kg.
Implications for interventions
The described medicinal plant market is not perfect but it is functioning. Interventions in the market should be targeted towards limiting exploitative relationships, in particular through providing harvesters and local traders with better access to credit and price information. End uses, and thus factors determining demand, are not known. However, assuming that most products are used mainly in traditional scholarly Indian systems of medicine, then demand is likely to grow with South Asian population and economic growth (Olsen 1998; Kate and Laird 1999) . Assuming an increase in demand, supply issues should receive attention. As noted by Larsen and Olsen (2007) , there are many unsubstantiated claims regarding the sustainability of supplies; however, the scientific evidence does not presently allow us to determine whether the Nepalese medicinal plant resource base is under-or overexploited. The scant data available on longterm real price development does not provide support to either an under-or an overexploitation scenario. It is also unclear to what extent environmental externalities are communicated through prices in the medicinal plant trade and to what degree such signals are clouded by pricing inefficiencies. We know that most products are harvested in the wild and, given the barriers to introduction of cultivation (Schippmann et al. 2002; Larsen and Olsen 2007) , attention should be given to community-based management of common medicinal plant resources. However, as some products such as S. mukorossi have been subjected to domestication, attention could also be given to support domestication processes for species where long-term high demand is expected.
The present study has used data from the case year 1997-98 to provide insight into how medicinal plant markets operate at regional and national levels; the study may serve as a basis for benchmarking future data collection and providing input to understanding the changes in medicinal plant markets over time.
Conclusion
Nepal and India have a functioning medicinal plant supply system that moves raw materials from Nepalese habitats to Indian manufacturers and from there to end users. The trade is of national economic importance to Nepal and provides significant harvester income. The market is in no urgent need of fixing but would benefit from interventions addressed at increasing pricing efficiency. There is also considerable scope for improving revenue collection in Nepal and integrating medicinal plants into future national development strategies and poverty reduction measures. The applied method should be replicable in the investigation of other data-deficient medicinal plant markets.
